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Abstract
The place of evidence regarding joint commitment and plural action is mostly 
reserved for documents and explicit linguistic expressions. This paper considers the 
problem of evidence in cases of engaged (jointly committed) social acts where there is 
no explicit expression or binding document, yet can still be ascribed to a plural subject. 
The argument rests on the double meaning of the term factum as fact (factum brutum) 
and deed (factum practica), as well as contemporary debates about the topic of fact of 
reason in Kant. The text seeks to show that in certain cases, the execution of an act 
or the obligation produced by it can be considered evidence of a plural subject. Thus, 
these facts deserve a special position in relation to scientific evidence.
Introduction
In the last few decades, the debate regarding the plural subject, collective 
intentionality, or about so-called philosophy of the social, has developed consid-
erably in philosophical circles, thanks to the work of Margaret Gilbert, Raimo 
Tuomela, John Searle and many others.
In this paper, we will attempt to offer a more “practical” understanding of the 
plural subject, consisting in the fact that the plural subject primarily announces 
itself in deeds, that is, in how members of a group de facto act, how they establish 
their will, how they subordinate their actions to their obligations produced by 
the plural subject, and how they influence change in those obligations. We thus 
offer a certain alternative to the cognitivistic conception of the plural subject. 
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The cognitivistic approach can in part be found in Gilbert when she cites the 
primary significance of beliefs and common knowledge for the achievement 
of joint commitment, as well as in Searle when discussing the general formula 
that belief and knowledge are necessary for collective intentionality (Searle 
2010: 46-54).
Our paper is inspired by the debate about “fact of reason” [Faktum der Vernunft] 
in Kant’s practical philosophy. For a long time, the dominant interpretation of 
“fact of reason” was that Kant meant evidence, that is, “matter of fact” [Tatsache], 
and the idea was not given much attention within Kant’s critical consideration. 
However, a novel interpretation was offered by Marcus Willaschek, claiming 
that fact of reason, as a factum practica, must be understood above all as deed 
[That] of reason. Willaschek’s main intention was to show the significance of 
the mind as practical, its role consisting of determining will. The fact of rea-
son in that regard ought to be understood as practical evidence, avoiding the 
reduction of the practical mind to the theoretical one in practical application 
(Willaschek 1991: 466). This fits with the understanding of a plural subject 
we will put forth here. To that end, we would like to draw some implications 
from this discussion.
Although we take social facts in this paper to be primarily deeds, it does not 
mean that they, just like facts, do not offer certain evidence of the existence of 
a plural subject. Just like the fact of reason, as the deed of reason, offers, that 
is, at the same time is the awareness of the moral law and a certain practical 
proof of freedom. The deeds of the plural subject, as social facts, also announce 
the obligations produced by the plural subject, providing simultaneously proof 
of its existence.
The first part of the paper deals with the understanding of facts of reason 
in Kant and relevant interpretations, with particular attention paid to the 
consideration of facts as “deed of reason”. In the second part, we will present 
the basis of the understanding of the plural subject and certain problems tied 
to the question of how we can have awareness of a plural subject, obligations 
it produces, and our own belonging to one. The third part of the paper will 
present the implications of previous considerations of how we can understand 
social facts as “deeds” that offer evidence of a plural subject. In the last part 
of the paper, we will compare briefly the relation of social facts as a kind of 
evidence with empirical evidence.
1. Fact of Reason
Kant’s designation in Critique of Practical Reason of the consciousness of the 
basic law [Bewusstsein des Grundgesetzes] as the fact of reason, about which no 
further deduction can be made, stands as one the most controversial places in 
his ethics. Kant himself is aware of the peculiarity of this term:
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The thing is strange enough and has no equal in all the rest of our practical cog-
nition. For the a priori thought of a possible universal legislation, a thought which is 
therefore merely problematical, is commanded unconditionally [unbedingt geboten] as 
a law without borrowing anything from experience or from any external will (Kant 
2002: 45, KpV, AA 05: 31.)
Kant introduces the term fact of reason as consciousness of the basic law in 
§7 of Critique of Practical Reason:
The consciousness of this basic law [Das Bewußtsein dieses Grundgesetzes] may be 
called a fact of reason [Factum der Vernunft], because one cannot reason it out from 
antecedent data of reason, e.g., from the consciousness of freedom (for this is not an-
tecedently given to us) – and because it, rather, thrusts itself upon us on its own as a 
synthetic a priori proposition not based on any intuition, whether pure or empirical. 
This proposition would indeed be analytical if the freedom of the will were presupposed; 
but for this, as a positive concept, an intellectual intuition would be required, which 
certainly cannot be assumed here at all. However, in order to regard this law – without 
any misinterpretations – as given, one must note carefully that it is not an empirical 
fact but the sole fact of the pure reason [kein empirisches, sondern das einzige Factum 
der reinen Vernunft], which thereby announces itself as originally legislative (sic volo, sic 
iubeo) (Kant 2002: 46, KpV, AA 05: 31.)
As justification of the fact’s actuality, Kant offers precious little. The Latin 
proverb at the end only indicates the pure possibility of reason to command 
what it wills. Further, on the following page, Kant introduces the argument 
that this fact is self-evident: “The previously mentioned fact is undeniable. One 
need only dissect the judgement which human beings make about the lawfulness 
of their actions” (Kant 2002: 46; KpV, AA 05: 32). However, Kant thus only 
indicates the assumed consensus omnium, and not necessity (a priori) that he 
requires in this place. Finally, Kant points to the similarity of the fact of reason 
with principles of reason in theoretical philosophy, by which he insists that 
this is indeed part of the critical procedure. “We can become conscious of pure 
practical laws [praktischer Gesetze] just as we are conscious of pure theoretical 
principles [theoretischer Grundsätze], by attending to the necessity with which 
reason prescribes them to us, and to the separating [from them] of all empirical 
conditions, to which that necessity points us” (Kant 2002: 43, KpV, AA 05:30).
1.1 Interpretations
Fact of reason as “matter of fact”. For a long time, the leading interpretations 
took fact of reason in its common sense meaning, as “something that has actual 
existence” [Thatsache]. Thus, many readers thought that Kant, without further 
explanation, assumes the existence of certain moral experience. In that way, 
L.W. Beck imputed to Kant a kind of moral intuitionism. (Beck 1961: 278) 
Authors like Ameriks were of the opinion that this is a step back in comparison 
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to Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in which Kant attempted to demon-
strate the deduction of the categorical imperative. These authors ascribe this 
to Kant seeking to bestow practical reason with immediate efficient causation 
(Ameriks 2002: 103). Other authors still ascribe this move to Kant’s desire to 
show that the moral law is something we encounter in daily life, in the sense 
of what the ordinary person immediately grasps (O’Neill 2002: 95). Although 
there is unequivocal textual evidence to back the claims of all these readers, they 
diminish the significance of facts of reason within the critical procedure as such.
Fact of reason as a technical term. Ian Proops defended a different approach. 
He thinks that the fact is a technical term, the main role of which is so-called 
legal metaphor that ought to serve as that which is provided simultaneously with 
the justification of a theoretical claim. In the specific case of consciousness of 
the basic law, it is the fact that has a pure origin, and should provide justifica-
tion for the deduction of freedom. However, Proops himself says that as such, 
Kant’s argument was unsuccessful, and is inappropriately confused (mixed up, 
conflated) with an understanding of fact as deed (Proops 2003: 215).
Fact of reason as deed. Marcus Willaschek suggested an interpretation, accord-
ing to which fact of reason precisely ought to be understood as deed [That] of 
reason (Willaschek 1991). This understanding of the term factum, is indeed 
founded upon the term’s literal meaning – “something done” – derived from 
the participle of the verb facere (to do something). In fact, this is the main use 
of this term in legal terminology until about the 17th, 18th centuries. Factum 
primarily referred to deeds (of the accused) to be examined, that is, deeds, the 
subject of the legal examination that require evidence. Only later does this 
term begin to be used in the scientific world, designating natural phenomena, 
primary effects of experiments, and later as what anyone can observe and of 
which there is no doubt.3
The question is, of course, what kind of use of the term can we assume in 
Kant. Fact can be understood as scientific fact. In §13 of Critique of Pure Reason, 
when he distinguishes the question of fact (quid facti) from the question of what 
is lawfull (quid iuris), Kant introduces the term factum, to designate facts about 
the existence of certain concepts which we know through experience (KrV, AA 
03:100). Then, in §14, Kant uses that term in order to designate facts of pure 
mathematics and natural science in general. (KrV, AA 03:106)
In aiming to show that we should understand fact of reason as deed, Wil-
laschek primarily draws on a sentence from the introduction of Critique of 
Practical Reason: “For if as pure reason it is actually practical, then it proves its 
reality and that of its concepts through the deed [durch die That]” (Kant 2002: 
4; KpV, AA 05: 3).
3 For more, see Ware (2014: 2-4).
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If we look at Kant’s manuscripts and lecture notes, it becomes clear that Kant 
uses this term very carefully in both senses, but also that he is entirely conscious 
of their difference. In the preparatory notes for The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant 
writes: “res facti physice tale est per experientiam (testimonio sensuum) cognoscibile 
(cognitum) – huc pertinet eventus. Factum practica tale est euentus ex causa libera 
s. qui arguit auctorem” [The physical fact is cognizable/knowable by experience 
(perceptual evidence) – and concerns the event. The practical fact is an event 
freely caused, and it announces the agent]. Elsewhere as well, Kant defines fac-
tum within the domain of practical philosophy, either as a free action or action 
subsumed under the moral law. For example, when speaking of free action: “A 
free action, if it can be subsumed under the moral law, is a factum” [Die freye 
Handlung, so fern sie unter einem moralischen Gesetze subsumirt werden kan, ist ein 
factum] (R 7131, AA 29:225). Or else, in a different place, as action subsumed 
under the moral law: “Factum is an action that falls under the law, indeed, the 
moral law” [Factum ist eine Handlung die unter einem Gesetz, eigentlich unter 
einem moralischen Gesetz steht] (V-Mo/Mron II, AA 24:641). Kant defines deed 
in almost the exact same way: “A deed is what we call an action insofar as it 
falls under laws of obligation, thus also insofar as the subject is regarded in it in 
terms of the freedom of his power of choice” [That heißt eine Handlung, sofern 
sie unter Gesetzen der Verbindlichkeit steht, folglich auch sofern das Subject in 
derselben nach der Freiheit seiner Willkür betrachtet wird] (Kant 2002: 4n; MS, 
AA 06:22). Given that at issue is practical philosophy, it stands to reason that 
we are dealing with factum practica, that is, the deed of a free agent.
All of which has several implications for the understanding of the role of facts 
of reason in Kant’s practical philosophy. The main consequence of the reading 
Willaschek offers is that it allows us to understand reason in facts of reason as 
truly practical. What is important is practical proof (praktische Beweis) that reason 
does indeed, through deed, determine will (Willaschek 1991: 466). Thus, in the 
strict sense, it is not crucial for the consciousness of the basic law that one learn 
it, but rather that it be applied, through deed in which will is determined by the 
moral law. As we shall see, this also allows for a more immediate explanation of 
the connection of fact of reason with the notion of freedom.
However, that fact of reason ought to be understood as deed does not mean 
that it or its product should not be taken to be something with actual existence. 
Accordingly, this means that it could also serve as evidence. We cannot wade 
into various interpretations4 in this paper; however, it is important to indicate 
the possibility that fact of reason as deed figures as evidence that is demonstrated 
as practical proof of freedom.
4 Cf. Willaschek 1991: 460; Kleingeld 2010: 65; Ware 2014: 2n.
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1.2. The structure of facts of reason
In order to say something more about the structure of the fact of reason, 
we will draw on Michael Wolff’s claim from “Warum das Factum der Vernunft 
ein Factum ist”. According to him, fact of reason is based on a synthetic act, 
which immediately connects (synthesizes) thought and the faculty of desire 
(Wolff 2009: 235). Kant defined the faculty of desire by way of causality of 
representations: “The faculty of desire [Begehrungsvermögen] is the being’s faculty 
to be through its representations the cause of the actuality of the objects of 
these representations” (Kant 2002: 14; KpV, AA 05: 9.). And he also defined 
will as a higher faculty of desire: “A faculty to determine (…) causality by the 
presentation of rules” (Kant 2002: 47; KpV, AA 05: 32). In the case of fact of 
reason then, the will is determined by the representation of the general form 
of the law. Therefore, this is the synthesis of the representation of the idea of 
the fundamental law with the faculty of desire, that is, with the causality of this 
representation regarding the reality of its object.
We should mention that causality in this context cannot be understood ac-
cording to the “event-event” model, as two separate events, but rather the way 
Eric Watkins explained (Watkins 2005), as “exercise of causal power”.5 Thus, 
fact of reason can be understood as deed of synthesizing the fundamental law 
with the manifestation of its causal power, making the fundamental law itself 
an objective principle of causality [objectiver Grundsatz der Causalität], much as 
Kant says in Critique of Practical Reason 6 (Kant 2002: 133; KpV, AA 05: 105).
To better understand all of this, we must look at the nature of this relation 
(of causality). In the Critique of Power of Judgement, Kant indirectly says that 
the nature of this relation is internal [innere] (KU, AA 05: 222). By relation, 
Kant here means the relation between the predication and its reason or ground. 
That the relation is inner means that the reason of predication is contained in 
the (logical) subject.7 In this specific case, this means that the reason of the con-
nection of the representation of the law with the causality of this representation 
is contained in the very law, by a necessity with which it determines the will.
This also allows us to better understand the connection between the fact of 
reason and the notion of freedom, although we will not be able to pay more 
attention to this question in our paper. Kant tells us that fact of reason is really 
identical with the consciousness of freedom: “This fact is inseparably connected 
with the consciousness of freedom of the will – indeed, that it and this conscious-
ness are one and the same” (Kant 2002: 60; KpV, AA 05: 42). This position 
5 Kant draws attention to this very problem in connection with the understanding of the 
faculty of desire in both (published and unpublished) introductions to Critique of the Power to 
Judgment (KU, AA 05:177-8; EEKU, AA20: 230).
6 Cf. Wolff (2009: IV, 532).
7 Cf. Longuenesse (2003: II, 155).
RdE_69_interni.indb   90 06/11/18   23:59
91
can be better understood if we accept that fact of reason is directly connected 
to causality manifested by the basic law. And given that freedom, according to 
Kant, consists precisely of the determination of causality not bound by empirical 
conditions, “as a causality of pure reason” (Kant 2002: 67; KpV, AA 05: 48), 
fact of reason can be understood to be identical to the consciousness of free 
determination of the will.
1.3. Imputatio facti/imputatio legis
In his lectures on the philosophy of morals, Kant mostly considers the term 
factum in the context of the difference between imputatio facti and imputatio 
legis, taking care to make a careful distinction between them. Imputatio facti 
refers to judgement of imputation [Zurechnung] of deed to an agent, freely 
chosen. The question to ask would be whether the action is done by this agent? 
Imputatio legis refers to the consideration whether an action is in accordance 
with the law, that is, whether it is meritus or demeritus. The question would 
then be whether the action falls under this or that practical (legal) law (V-Mo/
Mron, AA 27: 1438)?
If we attempt to apply these terms to fact of reason, we encounter an awkward 
situation that shows its exceptionality. Ordinary attribution of a deed takes place 
through a judgement whether an action is committed through free will, in the 
compatibilistic understanding of the term. For example, in the case of someone 
crossing the street, if they were not pushed, if there was no compulsion, etc./ 
However, as fact of reason is, according to Kant, directly tied to the notion of 
freedom, it is obvious that Kant’s intention was to claim that in this case, within 
this action, the status of fact is attributed immediately. Meaning that there is 
direct certainty that it is a question of an action of a free agent. Kant thought 
that he demonstrated the argument because it is entirely clear that the reasons 
for this procedure are pure, that is a pure form of the law, with no reference 
to the empirical. As our goal is only to delineate the general structure of the 
argument, we will not wade into the question of whether this “specific” part 
was executed successfully.
In the case of imputatio legis, we further find something else unusual. Ordinarily, 
the case with imputatio legis is to submit the action to existing laws – whether 
it falls under the existing laws and which ones? On the example of jay walking, 
for example, there would be a question whether it is allowed to cross the street 
at that spot, in that specific manner, etc. However, in the case of the fact of 
reason, it obviously does not need to be compared to another (existing) law; 
on the contrary, it is in the fact of reason that the basic law is announced, in 
relation to which all other actions will be considered. Thus, in the case of the 
(moral) fact of reason, we are not dealing with an (indirect) judgement used 
to determine whether an action does or does not fall under the law, but with a 
deed of subsuming will to law, announced in that very deed.
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1.4. Argument Revisited
A portion of Kant’s argument is directed at showing that fact of reason, as 
deed determined by the mere form of the law, is at all possible. The second 
part of the argument is certainly directed to showing that the mere form of the 
law is necessarily imposed as the imperative of the action, but we will not be 
touching on this question in this paper.
For our present purposes, what is particularly important in the understanding 
of fact of reason is the immediacy Kant gives it. First, in contradistinction to 
actions for which we ask whether such and such an action falls under a law, in 
the case of the fact of reason, it, on its own, announces the law according to 
which other actions ought to be considered. It thus is, on its own, conscious-
ness of the law. In addition, consciousness of the determination of will by law, 
based on its pure origin – not borrowing anything from experience – points 
to freedom. Thus, Kant offers practically proof of freedom: while we usually 
ascribe some action the status of factum practica by establishing that the action 
has been committed through free choice, fact of reason ought on its own to 
announce that the action was free.
2. Plural Subject
By “plural subject” we broadly here borrow the term from Margaret Gilbert. 
According to Gilbert, we can speak of a plural subject of a goal when there is 
joint acceptance of a (single) goal, which constitutes joint commitment (Gilbert 
1989: 163, 164, 199, 200; Gilbert 1999: II, 146).
We also take the basic modifications to the understanding of the plural 
subject made by Bennet W. Helm. He differentiated between two protocols: 
plural intentional system, in which many have the same goal-directedness that 
each has for themselves, and they coordinate to achieve this goal. Helm used 
the phrase coordinated we-commitments to designate Gilbert’s theory (Helm 
2009: 266); plural robust agency, on the other hand, is briefly when something 
carries import8 for an individual because it carries import for “us”. As opposed 
to Gilbert, this conception allows an understanding of a discussion about 
what obligations are produced by a plural subject, giving more significance to 
deliberation in general, which in turn implies a more dynamic and processual 
understanding of plural agency.
Can we bring anything from the discussion about fact of reason to bear on 
the discussion about the plural subject? Certainly, a portion of Kant’s argument 
8 Helm borrows the use of this term from Charles Taylor (Taylor 1985: 48) to designate the 
intentional characteric of an object (or event), to be viewed as worthy of pursuit or avoidance 
(see also Helm 2001: 32).
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can be left out. A plural subject we will be discussing here refers, above all, to 
an empirical case, rendering useless the apriority and necessity that form part of 
Kant’s argument. Further, Kant’s proof of freedom is not relevant here. However, 
it is not a coincidence that many authors think that morality is a kind of social 
action, that has as its specificity universal laws.9 The structure of plural agency, 
based on certain obligations and shared values is similar in this case too, and 
we will therefore attempt to draw from it certain implications.
One of the main problems considered by Margaret Gilbert emerges with 
the condition that the existence of a plural subject depends on the belonging 
of an individual to the plural subject. That is, the individual must be aware of 
belonging to a plural subject and only then can we speak of a plural subject 
(Gilbert 1989: 149). Gilbert resolves this problem by introducing the condi-
tion of expression on joint commitment, which justifies or grounds the belief of 
the plural subject, thus constituting common knowledge. Of course, we ought 
to mention that in later texts, Gilbert is more cautious with this cognitivistic 
approach, emphasizing that it is not an expression of belief, but that “each one 
expresses, in effect, a conditional commitment of his will” (Gilbert 1989: 222). 
In this way, we arrive at the two conditions to at all be able to speak of a plural 
subject: “Expression condition (each must have manifested his willingness for 
unity openly to the others) and common knowledge condition (this manifestation 
of willingness must be a common knowledge)” (Gilbert 1989: 223.).
Although John Searle is much more cautious with the idea that this problem 
can in any way be reduced to cognition, in key moments, he clearly leans on 
common knowledge as a necessary condition of collective intentionality in the 
general formula: “when each intends, and each knows that the other intends 
and each knows that the other knows that, and each knows that each knows 
that other knows that, and so on indefinitely” (Searle 2010: 46.). Searle also 
indicated that the main avenue for deontic powers to act on us is to recognize 
them: “Once recognized, they provide us with reasons for acting, that are in-
dependent of our inclination and desires” (Searle 2010: 9).
Helm, in contrast, while generally advocating abandoning the cognitive-cona-
tive divide, criticizes the reductive cognitivistic attempt at solving this problem. 
We are unable, of course, to present his critique in detail here, but we can briefly 
say that it draws on what Helm calls the deliberative problem. Namely, how is 
deliberation about values possible, because, on the one hand, when speaking of 
personal (not moral) values, we assume a certain autonomy: a person’s values are 
at least in part up to her; on the other hand, in order for rational deliberation to 
be correct (or incorrect), we must assume at least a certain degree of objectivity. 
Presenting this problem is very important for understanding the functioning of 
the plural subject when we pose a few questions: in what way do we argue about 
9 Helm (2001: 250); cf. Gilbert (1989: 392ff).
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the exact obligation produced or implied by the plural subject, and how do we 
change the content of joint commitment? Put simply, Helm’s main problem 
with the cognitivistic approach is that if we take values to be matters of belief, 
that is, an object of cognition, we leave very little room for the possibility of 
invention of values. The accomplishment of belief is ultimately none other than 
cognition, meaning that in this way cognitivistic theories can show how we 
discover values as matter of fact; however, they cannot show how we determine 
what values shall be, which is necessary if we are to leave room for deliberation 
itself (Helm 2001: 14-16, 201-205). (We ought to mention that Helm applies 
similar reasoning in rejecting the reductionist conative approach, according to 
which values depend merely on desires.)
Our intention is neither to negate nor diminish the significance of belief and 
cognition in the constitution of the plural subject. In many cases, it is certain 
that they play a crucial role. In particular, this is the case when there is truly 
verifiable, empirical evidence in favor of belief. For example, “clear expression,” 
of which Gilbert speaks, or certain kinds of “documented traces.” Such evidence 
certainly comprises the bases of our institutionalized communal life. However, 
it is also certain that there are cases in which such traces cannot be found. 
These are, for example, precisely the cases Gilbert deftly avoids: among friends 
or lovers, or within small communities there is no need for explicit expression 
of joint commitment, and such “groups” function much more flexibly than 
institutional communities. Similarly, in cases of certain social unrest, when the 
obligations produced by a plural subject are only being articulated.
If we take the plural subject in a more practical sense, we can take into con-
sideration the possibility that it is deeds that take place under (often not fully 
articulated) obligations (produced by the plural subject) that justify the plural 
subject, while at the same time ensuring awareness of the plural subject, which, 
in a practical way, allows for belonging to a group.
3. Social Facts as Deeds
3.1. Basic Examples of Social Facts as Deeds
If two people agree to travel from one place to another and acknowledge their 
joint plan by clear expression, then they have joint commitment. Each of them 
has a belief, justified by the evidence of expression of joint commitment and 
each their own belonging to it, as well as the belonging of the other. However, 
only if the two of them buy train tickets can we speak of a joint deed, executed 
jointly as a plural subject. This deed could be ascribed to them together, as a 
plural agent (rather than each individually), precisely because we possess knowl-
edge about the agreement previously made. Further, by judging the action with 
regard to the agreed obligations, each of them, as well as a third party, could 
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show whether this deed was appropriate or inappropriate. Thus, for example, 
one could show the meritus of the actual meeting, collecting the money for the 
journey, etc. or else show the demeritus that they were unable to buy the tickets 
as they did not have enough money or did not come to the train station.
The given example is of a social fact as deed. However, it needs to be said that 
in this case, it was the belief based on empirical evidence that can be provided 
(by way of expression of joint commitment or a document confirming it) that 
is the basis of the obligations as well as the existence of the plural subject itself.
In that sense, the usual cases of social facts as deeds do indeed show the ef-
ficiency of the plural subject and maintain its existence. The social character of 
this fact can be gleaned from the attribution of the deed to the plural subject 
(imputatio facti) and from the judgement of the deed with respect to the obli-
gation we are aware the plural subject is producing (imputatio legis). However, 
any evidence about whether these are truly social facts must be grounded in 
belief of obligation, simultaneously supported by documents and expressions 
that then constitute this plural subject.
Before we move on to more complex examples, let us take a look at the issue 
from the phenomenological perspective.
3.2. Rational Determination of the Will
For the consideration of the plural subject as a rational agent it is important 
to show that there is capacity to rationally motivate ourselves. Searle speaks 
about the motivation through recognition of desire-independent reasons, which 
can also be recognition of social obligations (Searle 2010: 127-131). Helm also 
points to the possibility of change in evaluative judgments, which is part of 
deliberation, thus directly affecting our motivation (Helm 2001: 177-189). Both 
authors consider the problem in a way similar to Kant, and are fundamentally 
answering the same (Humean) challenge as Kant himself. What is important for 
both authors is that there is capacity to determine our will in accordance with 
obligations (produced by a plural subject) independently from mere personal 
inclinations or desires.
It is not difficult to notice that the phenomenological structure of the ratio-
nal motivation of which Searle and Helm speak is similar to the case of fact of 
reason, where we see the subsumption under the moral law. Certainly, these 
are obligations of the plural subject, of empirical character, and therefore they 
cannot be based in apriority, necessity, or universality.
Still, we must allow one “phenomenological difference” in kind of experience 
we have: (1) the experience when we believe that X is the case (such as that we 
have an agreement to travel jointly with another person) and (2) the experience 
when the will is actually determined by the rule (obligation). The previous phe-
nomenological distinction implies various simultaneous ways in which we can 
be conscious of the obligations produced by the plural subject. One way is to 
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acquire belief based on empirical evidence. However, Kant’s explanation of the 
“fact of reason” we presented above marks the possibility of consciousness being 
constituted by the will being determined through deed [in der That], because 
the fact announces the related obligation. This second case is of particular im-
portance to us, because it indicates how members de facto have more practical 
consciousness of unity (see also Gilbert 1989: 222).
Instead of insisting that members, in one way or another, have a joint belief 
in the values or obligations produced by the plural subject or the significance of 
the belief of the other or other members, a more practical understanding of the 
plural subject emphasizes the significance in the members of a group de facto 
determining their own will under the obligations produced by the plural subject.
Thus far, we have assumed that the representation of the obligation produced 
by the plural subject is already given (from somewhere). Similarly, the deeds, 
which we have been calling social facts, were based on the previous belief about 
the existence of a specific obligation produced by the plural subject. In the further 
text, we will attempt to tease out a more interesting case, when the obligations 
of a plural subject are actually announced in the deed.
3.3. Basic Social Facts as Deeds
When we cited arguments about fact of reason, we said that one of its char-
acteristics is that, as opposed other deeds, it does not undergo judgement based 
on a previously given law (imputatio legis), but rather, that it is will subsumed 
under the moral law, announced in that very fact.
Our question is whether the analogous structure of this description could 
refer to the social act or social acts as well? Is it thus necessary for there to be a 
deed that consists of a subsumption of actions (will) under a certain obligation 
and in that way announces that very obligation as an obligation produced by 
a plural subject? In these cases it would indeed be necessary, if the deed could 
not be judged based on existing laws, but only according to the law or shared 
values this deed announces.
Indeed, many social actions have just such a character. In particular, we are re-
ferring to jointly committed acts related to social and political change, for example, 
attempts at establishing a potential alternative or “counter-institution”. Let us take 
as an example social protest, more specifically, the so-called “new protest move-
ments” or “pre-figurative politics”, in which there is no given goal at the outset, but 
rather, the goal is jointly constituted in the very way the protests are conducted. 
Obviously, it would be inappropriate to judge the action of protesting according 
to existing laws (the protests are after all directed at them). However, if a group of 
people, jointly protesting, aside from its resistance to existing institutions, in their 
deed announce an obligation (or shared values) they jointly produce, then this 
is the very law according to which the actions of the protestors, current or those 
yet to join this community, ought to be subordinated. Movements that advocate 
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pre-figurative politics would be a good example, as obligations are produced and 
announced in the very deeds the protesters are conducting.
The structure of these basic social facts as deeds could thus be marked as 
twofold. On the one hand, they do indeed have the fundametum in re, the deed 
committed in the physical world (factum brutum). However, on the other hand, 
such a fact cannot be reduced to the physical state of affairs precisely because it, 
on its own, announces the obligation or shared values (produced by the plural 
subject), which is its other aspect. If we remained on the first aspect only, we 
could never explain how many individual actions of group members could be 
ascribed to the plural subject. However, the very obligations produced by the 
plural subject, announced in the very deed, mean that we can immediately 
attribute them to the plural subject (imputatio facti).
In the same way that fact of reason can serve as a practical proof of freedom, 
these social facts offer a practical proof of the plural subject. More specifically, 
the announcements of the obligations or shared values the plural subject is pro-
ducing through deed comprise a certain practical proof and serves as evidence 
for plural agency, the ability of the plural subject to produce these obligations, 
which in turn obligate members of the group.
We cited a relatively extreme example (social change and pre-figurative pol-
itics) to all the better illustrate this kind of action. However, it would appear 
that a similar argument can be made in any kind of informal community, such 
as friends, lovers, etc. The content of the joint commitment is not established 
with a prior expression, document, or promise, but is constituted and announced 
in the joint actions themselves. However, the extent to which communities or 
groups function this way is a question that demands empirical investigation.
A potential criticism of this approach could be that the argument is cyclical, 
since it could be claimed that we must have prior knowledge or belief about what 
obligation is produced by the plural subject, in order for our actions to at all be 
able to subsume under these obligations. This looks like the usual criticism of 
the argument of collective intentionality: that collective intentionality must first 
be assumed in order for it to be possible. Gilbert solves this problem by showing 
that knowledge of Y (manifestation of willingness) constitutes X (existence of 
the plural subject) (Gilbert 1989: 223). In our argument this is not possible 
because there is no prior knowledge (expression or document). However, the 
only thing necessary for our present argument to function is that we abandon 
the usual causal-linear language. In brief, that something is an obligation of 
the plural subject and that members de facto act according to this obligation 
are not, and often cannot be, two different temporal events. On the contrary, 
the obligatory power of the subject occurs simultaneously with the members 
de facto acting for the sake of the obligation produced by the plural subject.10
10 Cf. Helm (2009: 282).
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4. Conclusion
In this text, by presenting one viewpoint on the plural subject that places 
emphasis on practice, i.e. how members of a group de facto act and determine 
their will, we attempted to show the way in which the specific kind of social 
facts – deeds – can serve as evidence of a plural subject, that is, practical proof 
that the plural subject is capable of producing obligations or shared values. This 
is true in the case when the act performed jointly announces its own obligation 
produced by the plural subject.
Evidence of a plural subject, based on social facts as deeds, is indeed similar 
to empirical evidence, because it has its grounding in the state of affairs. How-
ever, if we ignore the second aspect of social facts as deeds – that these deeds 
announce obligations or shared values – we would neglect to notice their social 
character. Thus, this kind of fact, as deeds that on their own announce social 
obligation can indeed be held to be a specific kind of evidence.
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